Bankruptcy--Statutory Bar to Habitual Discharge Not Applicable to Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plan by Burch, Joseph T.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 52 | Issue 2 Article 17
1963
Bankruptcy--Statutory Bar to Habitual Discharge
Not Applicable to Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plan
Joseph T. Burch
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burch, Joseph T. (1963) "Bankruptcy--Statutory Bar to Habitual Discharge Not Applicable to Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plan,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 52 : Iss. 2 , Article 17.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol52/iss2/17
RECENT CASES
While it is accepted by both views that a search made incidental
to a lawful arrest is reasonable, the difference between the two turns
upon the meaning which has been given by each to the word "inci-
dental." Under the first view if the search is made prior to the arrest,
the search is not "incidental," as this view requires the search to
follow the arrest. The second view, as adopted in the principal case
is that even if the search precedes the arrest, it may be incidental.
The decision of the principal case is not justified. The facts and
circumstances which prompted the search clearly indicated that the
defendant had present intention to commit a criminal act. Thus, the
officers had sufficient reason to effect an arrest of the defendant prior
to the search. While it might be advantageous to permit a search
prior to an arrest to avoid unnecessary arrests, this advantage is
greatly outweighed by the restriction that such a rule places on the
citizen's rights of security and privacy. An analysis of the decisions
rendered since adoption of the constitutional guarantees against un-
reasonable searches and seizures reveals an ever increasing area of
"reasonable" searches accompanied by increasing restrictions on the
rights of security and privacy. The ultimate test for the necessity of
the rule in the principal case is a test of public utility. Therefore, since
the view requiring the arrest to precede the search meets present law
enforcement needs, there are no social or economic values which
warrant courts adopting the broader rule.
foe Harrison
BANKRUPTCY-STATUTORY BAR TO HABrruAL DISCHARGE NOT APPLi-
CABLE TO CnAPTER XIII WAGE EuNEa PL".-Debtor filed a wage
earner plan under chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act' seeking an
extension of time to pay his debts in full. The proceeding was dis-
missed by the referee in bankruptcy because the debtor had received
confirmation of an extension within six years preceding the filing
of his present plan. The referee held that chapter III, section 14,
(c) (5)2 barred a subsequent confirmation within a six year period.
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas affirmed.
Debtor appealed to the court of appeals for the tenth circuit. Held:
152 Stat. 930 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1086 (1958).
230 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32 (c) (1952) provides:
"The court shall grant a discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt . ..
in a proceeding under this title commenced within six years prior to the date of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy had been granted a discharge, or had a com-
position or an arrangement by way of composition or a wage earner's plan by way
of composition confirmed under this title .. "
1964]
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Reversed. The statutory bar to discharge for those who too frequently
invoke the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act was not in-
tended to apply to those seeking to pay their debts in full over an
extended period. Because section 14, (c) (5) specifically included
wage earner plans by way of composition, but was silent as to
plans by way of extension, the court concluded that Congress had not
intended the statutory bar to apply to chapter XIII proceedings by
way of extension. In re Holmes, 809 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962).
Three situations may arise involving the application of section 14
(c) (5) to wage earner plans by way of extension. A debtor,
within a six year period, may apply for (1) two extensions, (2) a
straight bankruptcy proceeding and subsequent extension, or (3) an
extension and subsequent straight bankruptcy proceeding.
Only two reported cases involve the application of the six-year
discharge bar to the first situation; i.e., two wage earners plans by
way of extension. In the first of these cases a federal district court, in
the case of In re Bingham,3 applied the statutory bar to chapter XIII
proceedings by way of extension. Less than two years later, in the
case of In re Autry,4 the same court held that a confirmation of exten-
sion under a wage earner plan was not a bar to a subsequent con-
firmation of extension within a six year period. The district judge
attempted to reconcile these two cases, assuming that the first con-
firmation in the Bingham case was by way of composition in the
absence of specic language calling it an extension.5 This reconciliation
was made in the fact of specific language in the Bingham case that
there was no ". . . need to create a class of wage earner users, going
through life interest free, converting credit risks desirable for one year
to extensions of credit over three or four years, with resultant loss."°
It would seem the court in the Bingham case was speaking of a wage
earner plan by way of extension and that basically the two cases are
in conflict.
The Holmes case has the effect of settling the conflict within the
tenth circuit and presents persuasive authority for other jurisdictions.
Within the tenth circuit, at least, referees in bankruptcy and district
judges will no longer be able to apply their individual views regarding
the merit of the wage earner plan to a proceeding under chapter XIII.
3 190 F. Supp. 219 (D. Kan. 1960), appeal dismissed, Bingham v. Yingling
Chevrolet Co., 297 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1961).
4 204 F. Supp. 820 (D. Kan. 1962).
5 In re Autry, supra note 4, at 821, quoting from the Bingham case, stated:
"The question to be determined is whether a debtor is barred from procuring con-
firmation of a wage earner plan within six years of a prior confirmation."
6 190 F. Supp. 219, 221 (1960).
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The court in the Holmes case made a significant distinction be-
tween "compositions" and "extensions," in order to arrive at its
decision limiting the applicability of the statutory bar. In either
bankruptcy proceedings or a plan by way of a composition the debt
is not fully paid, but wholly or partially discharged, while in a
proceeding by way of an extension the debtor proposes to pay his
debts in full. This distinction goes to the very purpose of section
14 (c) (5), which is to prevent the habitual bankrupt from escap-
ing his responsibilities. The court in the Holmes case cited several
cases7 from other federal court districts supporting this distinction.
These cases involve either a wage earner plan by way of extension
and then a subsequent straight bankruptcy within a six year period,
or the reverse, a straight bankruptcy and subsequent extension. In all
of the cases an extension was distinguished from a discharge or a
composition, and it appears that there is now authority within five of
the nation's ten circuits for the adoption of the rule in the Holmes case.
Chapter XIII was enacted to relieve wage earners from attachment
and garnishment proceedings for a period of time to enable them to
meet their obligations in full without the stigma attached to being
adjudged a bankrupt. In view of the increasing tendency toward
credit buying among low income groups, chapter XIII was intended
to protect wage earners and salaried people within these groups.8
The act is not designed to discharge a person's debts when he finds
himself burdened through an over extension of his credit, an illness, or
other economic failures. Instead, he is to meet his debts out of his
future earnings, paid in to a trustee and distributed to his creditors.
He is given the protection of the court to accomplish this end. "It is
not a moratorium for debtors. ... It is amortization." 9
The creditors are also protected by the court. In numerous cases a
portion of the debtor's wages are paid directly into court by his
employer. This offers the debtor less opportunity to weaken while in
the process of completing his plan. Secondly, prior to the passage of
7 In re Verlin, 148 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, Fishman v. Verlin,
255 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Sharp, 205 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Mo. 1962);
In re Mahaley, 187 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Calif. 1960); In re Thom pson, 51 F. Supp.
12 (W.D. Va. 1943), in which the court stated, at 14: "[T]he difference is
between a proceeding wherein a debtor settles his indebtedness in an agreed
amount less than the amount owed [composition] and a proceeding wherein he
merely obtains an extension of time within which to pay in full [extension)."
8 Chandler, The Wage Earners' Plan: Its Purpose, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 169
(1961). The author, Mr. Walter Chandler, a former member of the House of
Representatives, was the sponsor of chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. In re
Mahaley, supra note 7, at 231.
9 Chandler, The Wage Earners Plan: Its Purpose, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 169, 170
(1961).
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chapter XIII, a debtor could only resort to voluntary bankruptcy, and
millions of dollars were being lost annually by creditors.1 0 Now much
of this can be recovered from a debtor's future earnings.
The purpose of section 14 (c) (5) is to prevent the creation of
a class of habitual bankrupts who might use the discharge element
of straight bankruptcy or composition plans at frequent intervals to
escape paying their debts in full."- The bar to habitual discharge sec-
tion was enacted in 1903.12 At that time there was no provision for
extensions. Normally, bankruptcy cases ended in the complete dis-
charge of a greater portion of the debt. As stated in In re Thompson,
3
"the reasons why a debtor should not be allowed to accomplish this
result as frequently as he chooses have no application to the situation
where the debtor offers to and does pay his debts in full." 4 In a
composition a debtor does not pay his debts in full, but receives a
partial discharge. Section 14 (c) (5) specifically bars a debtor
from resorting to this provision by arrangement or wage earner plan
by way of composition more than once within six years. The purposes
of the statutory bar have no application to extensions, since an exten-
sion contemplates the full payment of debts. The Holmes case reaches
the proper result in view of the purposes of both chapter XIII and
chapter III, section 14 (c) (5).
Joseph T. Burch
CoNsrrtmoNAL LAW-PROBABr CAUSE FOR SEARCH AND SEIzRE.-An
automobile riding low in the rear crossed a state line. Officers, on the
lookout for another vehicle suspected of carrying untaxed liquor,
stopped the automobile, searched it without a warrant, and found
untaxed liquor. The officers could not detect the liquor in any manner
before the search and had no information pertaining to this particular
automobile. The automobile was apparently being driven in a legal
manner. The trial court dismissed a forfeiture action against the
automobile on the ground of an unreasonable search. Held: Reversed.
The superior court found the search was reasonable on the basis of
probable cause and added: "A state should have the right to stop a
traveler coming into the state and to search his belongings to ascertain
whether he is bringing into the state any property upon which a tax
10 Ibid.
11 In re Thompson, 51 F. Supp. 12, 13 (W.D. Va. 1943).
12 30 Stat. 550 (1898), as amended, 32 Stat. 797 (1903).
13 51 F. Supp. 12 (W.D. Va. 1943).
14 Id. at 13.
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